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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Civil Procedure--Contribution Among Joint-TortfeasorsRights of Insurers
At the close of its 1965 Spring Term the North Carolina Supreme Court took a significant step in relaxing its previously
adamant stand denying contribution to an insurance company that
has paid a judgment rendered against its insured as a joint tortfeasor. The decision in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co.' arose out of a prior action by plaintiff Phillips to
recover for personal injuries he received when struck by a 1954
Ford.2 The Ford had been parked on the pavement without lights
and was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by defendant
Parnell. On motion of Parnell, Elliot, the owner, and Blue, the operator of the Ford, were made additional defendants as joint tortfeasors under section 1-240 of the North Carolina General Statutes.'
The court found Phillips had been injured by the concurring negligence of Parnell, Blue, and Elliot, and Phillips recovered from
Parnell a judgment of 3,500 dollars. Upon payment "by or on
behalf of" 4 Parnell of 3,500 dollars in satisfaction of this judgment,
Parnell was to recover from additional defendants Blue and Elliot
1,750 dollars and one-half the court costs. Parnell's insurance
company, Safeco Insurance Company of America, made full payment of the judgment.
Prior to the accident Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
had issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Elliot. Elliot,
as owner, and Blue, as operator, were each an "insured" under the
terms of the policy, and Nationwide was obligated to pay on behalf
of an insured all sums which the insured became legally obligated
to pay as a result of any accident arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of the car.5
'264 N.C.749, 142 S.E.2d 694 (1965).
Phillips v.Parnell, 261 N.C. 410, 134 S.E.2d 676 (1964).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
'Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
750, 142 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1965).
' The terms of the provision provided that the insurance company was
obligated:
To pay on behalf of the insured [Blue and Elliot] all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
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Parnell caused execution to be issued on the judgment against
Blue and Elliot. The execution was returned unsatisfied, and
Parnell then sued Nationwide for the amount of the contribution
judgment.' In the superior court, Nationwide pleaded as an affirmative defense allegations that Safeco rather than Parnell had made
full payment of the Phillips' judgment in discharge of its liability
under Parnell's insurance policy. On Parnell's motion the affirmative defense was stricken on the grounds that the facts alleged did
not constitute a defense. Nationwide appealed, and the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, stating that the allegations that
Safeco rather than Parnell had made payment meant Parnell was
not the real party in interest and could not maintain the suit.'
Safeco then sued Nationwide. The superior court sustained
defendant's demurrer to the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed,8
basing its decision on Nationwide's policy provision, reasoning that
since Safeco had discharged Parnell's liability it had become by
operation of law an equitable assignee of Parnell, succeeding to his
rights, and that as such it could compel Nationwide to perform its
policy obligation.' Since this provision is standard in North Carolina in all automobile liability insurance policies, the decision in practical effect amounts to a reversal of the court's prior rulings in this
field.
The rule against contribution among joint tort-feasors was first
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile.
Id. at 751, 142 S.E.2d at 696.
,The provision further provided:
No action shall lie against the company, unless as a condition precedent
thereto, the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been
finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual
trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the
company.
Any person or organization or legal representative thereof who has
secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled
to recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by
this policy.
Id. at 752, 142 S.E.2d 696.
7
Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723
(1965).
s Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
142 S.E.2d 694 (1965).
' For the text of the policy see notes 5 and 6 supra.
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announced in England in 1799.1" The English rule, however, was
abolished by Parliament in 1935.11 The policies behind the theory
seem to have centered on the proposition that there should be no
recovery where one's wrongful conduct has contributed to the injury.
Since the original English case dealt with intentional rather than
negligent conduct, the policy of deterring such intentional action by
not allowing contribution is clearly evident. In this country, many
jurisdictions have modified the common law rule by judicial decisions' and statutes,' but a majority of jurisdictions in which the
" Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
Although the case involved wilful not negligent tort-feasors, it was generally
adopted by American courts as pertaining to both. See Reath, Contribution
Between Persons Jointly Charged For Negligence-Merryweatherv. Nixan,
12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1899).

" Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26
GEo. 5, c. 30, § 6(1) (e). This act provided that any tort-feasor may recover
contribution from any other tort-feasor who was, or would if sued have
been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tort-feasor
or otherwise.
1 Only seven jurisdictions have allowed contribution between joint
tort-feasors without any form of legislation: District of Columbia, Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Iowa, Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa
800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) ; Maine, Bedell v. Reagen, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d
24 (1963); Minnesota, Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258
Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Pennsylvania, Goldman v. MitchellFletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928); Tennessee, Huggins v.
Graves, 210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Wisconsin, Bielski v. Schulze,
16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). Pennsylvania later adopted this
position in statutory form. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1964).
' Four jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from a joint tortfeasor, whether joined by plaintiff or not, and apportion damages among
joint tort-feasors in accordance with their relative degrees of fault. Arkansas,
ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1962); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1953); Hawaii, HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 246-10 to -16
(1955); South Dalkota, S.D. CoDE §§ 33.04A01-33.04A10 (1960). Thirteen
jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from joint tort-feasors, whether
joined by the plaintiff or not, and require that such action result in equally
divided damages: Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1962) (if tort
involves no moral turpitude); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2103-05

(Supp. 1964); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1964);
Massachusetts, MASS. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1964);
Michigan, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962); Missouri, Mo. STAT.

ANN. § 537.060 (1953); New Jersey, N.J. Rnv. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5
(1952); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1954); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960); Pennsylvania, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1964); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1957); Texas, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212
(1964); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1957) (if tort involves no

moral turpitude). Five jurisdictions allow contribution only from joint
tort-feasors joined by the plaintiff and equally divide damages. California,
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 875-880; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-2011
to -2012 (1956); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 335.5 (1957); New York,
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 1401; West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5481-82
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contribution rights of negligent tort-feasors are not controlled by
statute still hold that the fact that the joint tort-feasor's injurycausing conduct was negligent rather than intentional furnishes no
basis for freeing them of the burden of the general rule that there
can be no contribution among tort-feasors.' 4
In 1929 North Carolina adopted a statute allowing contribution
between joint tort-feasors and joint judgment debtors. 5 In 1936,
however, the statute's effect was limited by Lumbermen's Mut. Ins.
Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.' In Lumbermen's the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated that "a most liberal construction of
the statute will not permit the writing into it of the liability insurance
(1961).

In a recent Kentucky decision the court chose not to award

damages equally under the Kentucky statute. See Elpers v. Kimbel, 366
S.W.2d
157 (Ky. 1963).
14
E.g., Kellenberger v. Widener, 159 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1963); Dobbins
v. Beachler, 47 Ill. App. 2d 30, 197 N.E.2d 518 (1964); Reid v. Royal Ins.
Co., 390 P.2d 45 (Nev. 1964); Wilson v. Herd, 1 Ohio App. 2d 195, 204
N.E.2d 389 (1965); Graves v. Shippey, 215 Ore. 616, 300 P.2d 442 (1956).
See generally annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958). For arguments concerning,
the policy of allowing contribution between joint tort-feasors, see the opposing positions of Professors James and Gregory, Contribution Among Joint
Tort-feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism; A Defense, 54 H~Av. L. REv. 1156

(1941).
"5 N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953):
In all cases in the courts of this state wherein judgment has been, or
may hereafter be, rendered against two or more persons or corporations,
who are jointly and severally liable for its payment either as joint obligors
or joint tort-feasors, and the same has not been paid by all the judgment
debtors by each paying his proportionate part thereof, if one of the
judgment debtors shall pay the judgment creditor, either before or after
execution has been issued, the amount due on said judgment, and shall,
at the time of paying the same, demand that said judgment be transferred
to a trustee for his benefit, it shall be the duty of the judgment creditor
or his attorney to transfer without recourse such judgment to a trustee
for the benefit of the judgment debtor paying the same; and a transfer
of such judgment as herein contemplated shall have the effect of preserving the lien of the judgment and of keeping the same in full force
as against any judgment debtor who does not pay his proportionate part
thereof to the extent of his liability thereunder in law and in equity,
and in the event the judgment was obtained in an action arising out of
a joint tort, and only one, or not all of the joint tort-feasors, were made
parties defendant, those tort-feasors made parties defendant may, upon
motion, have the other joint tort-feasors ... made parties defendant.

Any judgment creditor who refuses to transfer a judgment in his
favor to a trustee for the benefit of a judgment debtor who shall tender
payment and demand in writing a transfer thereof to a trustee to preserve his rights in the same action, as contemplated by this section,
shall not thereafter be entitled to an execution against the judgment
debtor so tendering payment.
16211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936).
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carrier of tort-feasors when only tort-feasors and judgment debtors
are mentioned therein." 7 In contrast, other jurisdictions have taken
the position that, since the theory of contribution is equitable in
nature, a contribution statute should be liberally construed to include
the insurance companies of tort-feasors.18 This is the position taken
by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.' 9
The Lumbermen's decision attained its real significance with the
advent of compulsory liability insurance in North Carolina."
Exclusion of the insurance company from the right to contribution
in a state where all motorists are required to have liability insurance
certainly made the statute less meaningful.
An attempt to distinguish the Lumbermen's decision came in
Squires v. Sorahan." Counsel for plaintiff in Squires argued that
17

Id. at 17, 188 S.E. at 636.
E.g., Silver Fleet Motor Express Inc. v. Zody, 43 F. Supp. 459 (E.D.
Ky. 1942); State v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1961). This decision
interpreted the Missouri statute on contribution as also giving insurance
companies the right to enforce the judgment although only the word "defendant" appeared in the statute. American Employers' Ins. v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 218 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1954). Here the court applied a Virginia
statute on contribution and reasoned that liberality should be favored in the
application of the doctrine of contribution, since the doctrine had its basis
in the broad principles of equity, and since the Virginia statute did not
specifically exclude the right to contribution from insurance companies, the
right extended to them also. The court also disagreed with the interpretation of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Lumbernten's decision and
specifically rejected the court's argument.
" UNIFORm CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFFASORS AcT § 1(e). The 1955
Revised Act was the first to contain this section. It provides that:
A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the
liability of a tort-feasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation
as insurer is subrogated to the tort-feasor's right of contribution to the
extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tort-feasor's pro rata
share of the common liability; and this provision does not limit or impair
any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
The original Act was promulgated in 1939. It was adopted in Arkansas
(1941), Delaware (1949), Hawaii (1941), Maryland (1941), New Mexico
(1947), Pennsylvania (1951), Rhode Island (1940), and South Dakota
(1948). As indicated this original act did not contain the insurance provision. Most of the states that adopted the 1939 act had made important
changes in it which defeated the idea of uniformity. For that reason and
because of unfavorable reports as to the progress and operation of the act,
the commissioners withdrew it from further study and revision. Massachusetts and North Dakota have specifically adopted the 1955 revised act.
See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960). See also CAL. Cw. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880.
" MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND FINANCIAL REsPONSIBILITY AcT OF
1953, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960), 12 MmEcER L. REv. 276 (1960).
See also 41 N.C.L. Rnv. 882 (1963).
18
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the earlier decision merely held that a liability insurance company
upon paying more than a proportionate share of the judgment,
could not go directly against the insurance company of the other
joint tort-feasor and did not rule out an action against the joint
tort-feasor himself."2 The North Carolina Supreme Court, however,
took the position that an insurance company that pays a joint tortfeasor's obligations to the injured party cannot force contribution
from other tort-feasors. "G.S. § 1-240, as interpreted by the many
decisions of this Court cannot be stretched to include subrogation,
which arises by reason of contract, into contribution, which arises
by reason of participation in the tort."2"
Another attempt to circumvent the Lumbermen's decision came
in Herring v. Jackson. 4 This case arose out of a prior action in
which the injured party had sued Herring for injuries received in
an automobile collision, but Herring made no attempt to bring in
Jackson as a joint tort-feasor. Being convinced that he could not
successfully defend the action against him, Herring settled with
the injured party, and a consent judgment was entered against him.
In an attempt to preserve Herring's contribution rights against Jackson, Herring's insurance company, Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, executed a "loan receipt" to Herring and made full payment of the judgment against him.25 When Jackson subsequently
sued Herring for injuries received in the accident Herring counterclaimed for his own injuries. The court found for Herring on the
counterclaim. Herring then brought suit against Jackson in an
attempt to enforce contribution, under section "1-240, to the original
consent judgment. The North Carolina Supreme Court felt the
"loan receipt" was a subterfuge to subvert sections 1-57 (the realparty-in-interest statute) 26 and 1-240 and held the settlement repreBrief for Appellant, p. 17.
Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 591, 114 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1960).
2
u255N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961).
22
2

= The agreement stated that Herring, the insured, receive the sum re-

quired to pay the judgment against him from the insurance company as a
loan to be repayable only in the event and only to the extent any recovery
might be obtained by plaintiff from defendant as joint tort-feasor. Herring
agreed to cooperate with the insurance company and to allow suit to be
brought in his name if necessary to the extent that all rights of contribution
which he had or might thereafter acquire be enforced. The expense of
litigation was to be borne by the insurance company, and if action brought,
it would be under sole control of the insurance company. Id. at 542, 122
S.E.2d at 370-71.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
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sented not a loan but payment under the policy. Thus the insurance
company, not the insured, was the real party in interest, 27 and since
the insurance company has no right to contribution under section
1-240, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed.2"
It can be deduced from these prior decisions that if the insured
brings an action for contribution under section 1-240 after his
insurance company has paid the judgment he may not recover,
since the insurance company, not the insured, is the real party in
interest.' On the other hand, if the insurance company brings the
action in its own name against the additional defendant after judgment has been rendered it cannot succeed, since the insurance company, as the statute is interpreted by the court, is neither a joint
tort-feasor nor a joint judgment debtor.30
All these prior decisions involved secondary suits brought to
obtain judgments under section 1-240 after payment of an original
judgment by the insurance company. This situation elicited one
writer to comment that
as the law apparently now stands, an insurer must bear the
entire burden if it satisfies a judgment before judgment is entered in favor of its insured for contribution against the joint
tort-feasor; that is, the liability carrier can preserve its insured's
right to contribution only by impleading the joint tort-feasor as
an additional defendant. By this procedure, plaintiff's judgment
against the insured and the latter's judgment against the additional defendant for contribution are entered at the same time
thus preserving the right.31
" For the position that under a "loan receipt" an insurance company is

the real party in interest see Crocker v. New England Power Co., 347 Mass.

1313, 202 N.E.2d 793 (1964) ; Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d
437" (1938); Cf. Cunningham v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51

S.E. 1029 (1905).

Generally, an insurance company that pays a claim in full becomes
the real party in interest and must sue in its own name against a tort-feasor
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57. Where an insurance company pays only
part of the loss and the insured pays the balance over the policy limit, the
insurance company is subrogated to the insured's right only to the extent
of payment by the company. In such a case the insured remains the real
party in interest, and the insurance company is a proper party but not a
necessary party to the suit. See, e.g., Jewell v. Price, 259 N.C. 345, 130
S.E.2d 668 (1963); Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
.9 Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960); Gaffney v.
Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 184 S.E. 46 (1936).
"0 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211

N.C."'41
13, N.C.L.
188 S.E.Rav.
634 882,
(1936),
15 N.C.L.
887-88
(1963). Rv. 289 (1937).
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However, earlier in the 1965 Spring Term it appeared that the
court had also closed this avenue of escape for insurance companies
and indeed strengthened its noncontribution position. In Parnellv.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,32 Safeco's first attempt to secure contribution arising out of the Phillips action, as previously indicated
the court had reiterated the Herring rule. In the negligence action
by Phillips, the injured party, against Parnell, Blue and Elliot were
brought in as additional defendants by Parnell, and counsel for
Parnell argued that this distinguished the case from Lumbermen's,
Squires, and Herring.3 The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that Parnell had made no payment nor otherwise
defendant and
suffered any loss for which he had a claim against
34
interest.
in
party
real
the
be
therefore could not
This ruling came as no surprise and in fact followed the reasoning of the court's prior decisions. But two months later in Pittman
v. Snedeker35 the court reached a totally anomalous result, which
proved to be a harbinger of its decision in Safeco. In Pittman the
plaintiff, a minor, was injured when an automobile operated by
his mother and an automobile operated by Snedeker collided. Plaintiff brought suit against Snedeker to recover for injuries received
in the accident. Snedeker denied liability and filed a cross-action
against the mother as an alleged joint tort-feasor. The mother
was made an additional defendant. The jury found plaintiff was
injured by the concurring negligence of Snedeker and the mother.
A judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff which provided that
upon satisfaction of the judgment by Snedeker, he could recover
one-half the amount from the mother. Snedeker's insurance company, United Services Automobile Association, made full payment
of the judgment. Snedeker then caused execution to issue against
the joint tort-feasor, plaintiff's mother. The mother then brought
suit to enjoin this execution and, when an injunction was refused,
appealed. To follow the reasoning of its prior decisions the North
Carolina Supreme Court had only to state that Snedeker was not
the real party in interest. Counsel for plaintiff pointed this out in
his brief and relied upon Lumbermen's, Squires, and Herring to
263 N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
for Appellee, pp. 3-4.
"Brief
4
' Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 445, 449, 139 S.E.2d
723, 726 (1965).
- 264 N.C. 55, 140 S.E.2d 740 (1965).
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support his position." This was the same argument advanced by
counsel for the defendant in Parnell17 and adopted by the court
as the basis for its decision in that case."8 But the court refused to
accept the reasoning that it had arrived at two months earlier and
affirmed the lower court's refusal to enjoin the execution. The
court distinguished Herring in a perfunctory manner, saying "appellant ignores the factual differences .... The difference is vital."39

This apparently meant that in Herring execution was returned
unsatisfied and the original defendant was trying to enforce his
contribution judgment by affirmative action, whereas in Pittnan
execution was issued on the contribution judgment and the additional defendant was trying to enjoin the execution. If this is the
factual difference the court was alluding to, then one must conclude
that the original defendant is not the real party in interest for
affirmative action to enforce contribution but he is the real party
in interest in an execution where the additional defendant is seeking
an injunction. Since in both instances the insurance company made
the settlement, the type of action should have no bearing on which
party is the real party in interest. Since this reasoning is so inconsistent, it seems clear that the court was actually reevaluating its
prior rulings when it stated "no sound reason appears why the
insurance carriershould be penalized for performing its contractual
obligation."40 This statement is indeed an anomaly in light of the
prior decisions, but it is a welcome one.
It is important to note that in all the decisions discussed above
the injured party sued one defendant who then brought into the
"3Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6, Pittman v. Snedeker, 264 N.C. 55, 140

S.E.2d 740 (1965).

"7Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-9, Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263

N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723 (1965).

See note 34 supra.
Pittman v. Snedeker, 264 N.C. 55, 57, 140 S.E.2d 740, 743 (1965).
40 The court stated:
There has been no cancellation of the judgment for which appellant is
liable. She makes no claim that she has paid the debt which a court of
competent jurisdiction has solemnly declared she owes. She seeks to
escape her obligation because an insurance company made the payment
as required by its contract with the original defendant. The insurance
company was not a volunteer. If Snedeker had borrowed the money
from someone under no obligation to make a loan, and, as security for
the loan, assigned his judgment in favor of the additional defendant, no
one would question the right of the assignee to enforce the judgment
against the additional defendant.
Id. at 58, 140 S.E.2d at 743-44. (Emphasis added.)
fl
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action an additional defendant as a joint tort-feasor. This situation should be distinguished from the situation in Greene v. Charlotte
Chem. Labs., Inc.4 In Greene the court reached the "unfortunate"'
decision that when the injured party chooses to sue all the tortfeasors jointly, a defendant in the action cannot cross-claim for
contribution against any codefendants before judgment has been
entered against all of them jointly. Therefore, if the plaintiff
takes a voluntary nonsuit or suffers an involuntary nonsuit as to one
defendant, his codefendants cannot act to retain him as a party in
the action, but must pursue a separate action for contribution after
their liability to plaintiff has been judicially determined. If in
such a situation an insurance company had paid a codefendant's
obligation to the plaintiff, whether it would be able to pursue this
separate action to enforce contribution under Safeco has not yet
been decided. However, to deny insurance companies this right
would be in effect basing the decision on whether the plaintiff
decides to sue all the tort-feasors instead of only one of them.
The Safeco decision, as previously indicated, was based on a
standard provision of an automobile liability insurance policy. This
provision was present even in the policy involved in the Lumbermens decision in 1936, and, certainly, the court could have relied on
it in a number of similar cases. Basically, the court in Safeco stated
that plaintiff, having discharged Parnell's liability to Phillips, became
by operation of law an equitable assignee and as such acquired
Parnell's rights to enforce payment from Blue and Elliot. 3 The
court then, in an apparent reference to its rule in Pittman, said that
Safeco could by execution or action enforce the judgment against
Blue and Elliot.4 This in effect means that Safeco, an insurance
company which had paid a judgment rendered against its insured
as a joint tort-feasor, could by affirmative action enforce a contribution judgment against a joint tort-feasor who had been made an
'-254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961). For a criticism of the decision see
40 N.C.L. Rav. 633 (1962).
' See Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties), Survey of North
Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L. REv. 873, 884-85 n. 44 (1965).
" The theory that the insurance company becomes by operation of law
an equitable assignee to the insured's rights is not a new one. See, e.g.,
Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. McLean Trucking Co., 256 N.C. 721, 125 S.E.2d 25
(1962); Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957); Cunningham
v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029 (1905).
""Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
751, 142 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1965).
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idditional defendant. This nullifies the reasoning of the court in
Pittman that the case is distinguishable from Herring on the basis
of the types of action involved. The cases are in complete disagreement.
The court then reasoned that all this imposes no obligation
on Nationwide, but that an obligation does exist as a result of the
insurance contract which was intended to protect Blue and Elliot
from judgments imposing liability on them for the negligent operation of the automobile. Since Safeco acquired its insured's rights by
making payment of his judgment liability, it could compel Nationwide to perform its contract.
Though the result in the decision is rather indirect, it is certainly in the right direction. It now appears that, although contribution per se does not exist between insurance companies, the
insurance company which pays its insured's judgment can enforce
by execution or action contribution from either the additional defendant under Pittman, or from his insurance company under
Safeco. Whether insured can bring suit in his own name, however,
seems doubtful without express reversal of the Herring decision.
Since the common-law rule of not permitting contribution between joint tort-feasors was abrogated by statute in North Carolina,
it seems apparent that the legislature must have realized the obvious
injustice of allowing one defendant to pay an entire loss when two
defendants were responsible. Since automobile liability insurance
is compulsory in North Carolina, if the efficacy of the statute is
to be realized to any extent, there is no valid reason for denying
insurance companies a right to participate. Most of our tort litigation today involves automobile collision situations and in a very
real sense insurance companies are the only "real parties in interest."4 5 Safeco, in effect, reflects this realistic approach to the

problem.
JAMES A. MANNINO

"Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Parnell v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 263
N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723 (1965).

